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Academicians have realized that the opportunities and challenges of autonomous driving (AD) 2 
coexist, thus the governance of this revolutionary technology is vital to enhance the benefits of 3 
AD whilst avoid its risks. In this article, we attempt to response to this question and take the 4 
AD development in China as an example to examine the governance situation of it. The 5 
positions and responsibilities of important stakeholders (the government and firms) for 6 
developing AD in Chinese special administrative system environment are studied at first. Then, 7 
the regulatory relationship between them is discussed through investigating relevant policy 8 
documents, firm websites and media reports. The investigation shows that, thus far, the 9 
legislative process on AD governance is relatively lagging. The government's responses in 10 
most instances are relatively conservative, and focus on creating normative documents to better 11 
regulate AD. There is therefore a comparative lack of commitment to the AD’s legitimacy. In 12 
contrast, enterprises are the pioneers of AD development. They actively explore the future of 13 
automation technology and the formulation of policies via extensive alliances sharing the risks 14 
and uncertainties of this innovation. To address this governance issue, strategies ranging from 15 
supplying transportation infrastructure, investing in AD through government-led industrial 16 
funds to reaching public-private partnership have been adopted. However, it is not clear 17 
whether this enterprise-led industrial development direction is consistent with the government's 18 
management goals, although these industry lobbies are actively promoting effective policy 19 
making. 20 
Keywords: Revolutionary Technology; Autonomous Driving Development, Stakeholders, 21 
Governance Situation.  22 




Autonomous driving (AD) have a revolutionary impact on both future transportation 2 
and society (1). Since Google released its first fleet of autonomous vehicles (AVs) in 2010 (2), 3 
the research progress on AD has accelerated significantly worldwide. At present, the research 4 
on AD mainly focuses on two issues: 5 
(a) How to ensure the technical reliability of AV (3)?  6 
(b) How to evaluate the possible impact of AD on society? (see (4) for details).  7 
For the first issue, many literatures have defined the safety challenges that the automation 8 
technology faced and have proposed corresponding solutions (5-7). For the second issue, 9 
scholars have drawn various conclusions which suggest the uncertain future of AD. For 10 
example, when it comes to economy development, self-driving mobility can reduce safety and 11 
time costs significantly (8), whilst create a situation that jobs in the transportation and logistics 12 
sectors are likely to be replaced due to the introduction of AD (9, 10); when it comes to 13 
environment issues, AVs can be conductive to energy saving in the long term, whilst lead to 14 
increased energy use because of longer travel distances and induced trips by underserved 15 
populations such as disabled, and elderly (11,12). 16 
Therefore, according to the current research achievements, the impact of AD on the 17 
future society is unpredictable, and appropriate governance strategies can help enhance the 18 
potential benefits of AVs whilst avoid negative or unexpected scenarios (13). However, the 19 
research on this governance challenge to date is very limited. There are some works 20 
highlighting the importance of AD’s governance and providing some regulatory strategies for 21 
future development in view of the potential risks of AD (13-15). But there is no country-22 
specific literature describing the current governance situation of AD, which is the foundation 23 
for putting forward reliable measures. 24 
This paper tries to fill this gap. China, aiming at building its strength in transportation, 25 
is taken as an example, whose innovative development mode for AD has important practical 26 
significance for the AD’s development in the global scope. Before discussing the position and 27 
responsibility allocation of stakeholders in developing AD, we briefly introduce the special 28 
political environment under Chinese administrative system reform. Then based on the 29 
consideration of the regulatory relationship among stakeholders in supporting AD, the 30 
management and governance situation for AD in China is examined. 31 
Aiming at investigating the above-mentioned problems, the research scope is limited to 32 
the following aspects: 33 
 First, there are many stakeholders in the AD industry, including the government, 34 
enterprises, the users, etc. Among them, the government and enterprises are the 35 
research objects of this paper, because the innovation activities of enterprises reflect 36 
the industry and market development, and the legislative environment formed by the 37 
government has a significant impact on enterprises (16,17). In addition, the users 38 
involved mainly include those who own AVs and the labor market related to driving. 39 
The acceptance degree of car owners and the employment problems resulting from 40 
AD will affect the future development process and direction of it. But this impact will 41 
be in the distant future, as Milakis et al. (4) defined it as the "third-order" stage of AD. 42 
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In view of the fact that AD in China are at the road test stage and not commercialized, 1 
and the market penetration is low, the implications of users on AD is not within the 2 
scope of this study. 3 
 Second, it is worth noting that the policy documents of national governments are 4 
mainly examined in this research. The reasons are as follows: 5 
(a) China’s AD industry has just realized the AVs production of SAE Level 2 (18) and 6 
the main policies are guidance documents which are usually issued by the national 7 
government; 8 
(b) Although the AD industry is under the dual regulation of the national government 9 
and local governments, the national government centralizes the power of local 10 
governments, resulting in consistent policies of these two level governments. 11 
Therefore the concern for government at the national level is limited but reasonable. 12 
In this study, China's administrative system reform which exerts an influence on AD 13 
industry regulation is outlined in the next section. With respect to the positions and 14 
responsibilities of the government and enterprises for developing AD, this paper mainly 15 
describes its different attitudes and governance entities. Then, specific sections present and 16 
analyze some examples of stakeholders’ regulation and their mutual relationship. The 17 
conclusion summarizes the current governance situation of China's AD promotion and 18 
proposes the future research directions. 19 
 20 
CHINESE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM CONTEXT 21 
The industry development is influenced by the structure of the state administrative 22 
system (19). The main connotation of the national administrative system structure includes the 23 
definition of government functions, the relationship between government and firms, etc. 24 
Chinese traditional administrative system structure is relatively centralized, namely, the 25 
government has a strong decision-making power, as well as a large number of public resources 26 
(20). Thus, the traditional government plays an omnipotent role involving owners, operators, 27 
managers and distributors, who allocates resources and manages the development of 28 
enterprises through directive plans, thus controlling the industry economy (21). 29 
However, this centralized regulatory mode can inhibit the independent innovation 30 
power of enterprises, and fail to meet the growing industry development demands. Recognizing 31 
the deficiencies of the government's overall control on enterprises, Chinese government has 32 
practiced gradual improvement and reconstruction of its functions undergoing six 33 
administrative reforms in the past 30 years. The initial attempt was to guide market participants 34 
to innovate actively with policies, such as the implementation of industrial park policy and the 35 
foreign investment introduction policy (22). But these policies have not changed the dominant 36 
position of the government in the previous government-enterprise relationship. With the 37 
continuous reforms of the administrative system, the government is increasingly aware that 38 
enterprises are the main body of the socialist economy. And thus the government should not 39 
regard itself as the manager of the firms, but should regard the firms as the creator of social 40 
wealth, the practitioner of social harmony and stability, as well as the government service object. 41 
The connotation of government's role shift involves:  42 
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(a) The scope of its role: from omnipotent government to limited government, affirming 1 
the subject pluralism of state governance, namely, government, industry, society and other 2 
subjects in the management of national and social public affairs. 3 
(b) The regulatory mode: the government, sets up government supervisory bodies to 4 
supervise and control the activities of market participants instead of managing firms by 5 
administrative means such as issuing orders, in order to prevent and remedy market failure. 6 
In contemporary society, the concept of government functions has undergone 7 
tremendous changes. The most advantageous evidence is the "Program for Deepening the 8 
Reform of Party and State Institutions" (23) issued by the Communist Party of China (CPC) 9 
Central Committee in 2018, which highlights the position of the market in the resource 10 
allocation process. Meanwhile, service government, is the main trend of development of 11 
China’s administrative reform. Furthermore, Chen Baoshing (Member of CPC Central 12 
Committee) said: "One of the most important relationship which is necessary to appropriately 13 
deal with in establishing a service government is the relationship between the government and 14 
the firms. Descriptively, the government is expected to control state-owned capital and 15 
investment instead of regulating the firms all around. All firms’ activities will happen according 16 
to the market law" (24). 17 
 18 
GOVERNANCE SITUATION IN THE ADVENT OF AD 19 
The comprehensive reform of China's administrative system has led to a shift of the 20 
power balance from government hierarchies to a broader decision-making network involving 21 
more stakeholders. Therefore, in terms of the governance issues on an emerging technology, 22 
i.e. AD, the government tends to disperse the responsibilities to various interest groups, 23 
typically enterprises. Relying on this mechanism, in order to explore the development prospects 24 
of AD in China, the basic and core issues are: (a) what the unique positions of different 25 
stakeholders (i.e. government and enterprises) are in supporting the AD’s development and (b) 26 
how the responsibilities are allocated among them. 27 
 28 
Challenges of Government  29 
Although the government is aware of the limitations of its capabilities (25), it is 30 
generally accepted that the government plays a decisive role in the management of AD’s 31 
development and the shaping of markets associated with it (26-28).When the innovation of AD 32 
supports the government’s key functions, the government is expected to participate in the 33 
development of it and influence the main ways of its diffusion (just like the government tries 34 
to achieve its emission targets through supporting large-scale use of electric vehicles via 35 
financial subsidies (29)). Its traditional incentive policies include legislation, sponsoring the 36 
development, cooperation with enterprises, and even self-development of new technologies 37 
(e.g. defense technology). These incentives can be categorized as government interventions to 38 
support a certain industry, which can be problematic: they may reflect interests of the lobbying 39 
groups, focus on technological leaps with insufficient market evaluation, or cause promises 40 
which are difficult to withdraw (30). In addition, government interventions may also lead to 41 
some controversial criticisms, accusing the government of inefficiency and "ill-conceived" acts 42 
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in a situation where large amounts of investments do not seem to get a good return. If the 1 
government does not intervene, such inaction will also cause public discontent, believing that 2 
it is negligent in achieving social well-being (31). Thus, it is a challenging task for the 3 
government to master the regulatory balance for AD to ensure that the government is able to 4 
realize its own functions well while encouraging the firms’ innovation power for self-driving 5 
development. 6 
 7 
Aspiration of Firms  8 
Generally, the government will make policy decisions on emerging automation 9 
technology to support its key functions, whilst it can be expected that enterprises will enhance 10 
their competitiveness in a rising industry relevant with AD by participating in the development 11 
and innovation process of it (i.e. occupying the automation fields and acquiring new AV users). 12 
What’s more, firms’ participation may also include the implementation of management 13 
functions or social responsibilities clearly authorized by the government, and involve the fields 14 
where the government has not intervened (or neglected by the government) (32-34). However, 15 
firms and governments have different management motivations. For example, in the traditional 16 
industry economy, the actions of private firms are motivated by market profits, which means 17 
that there will be inadequate investment in some areas where the uncertain risks are too high 18 
and the predicted profits are insufficient (35-37). And companies are thought to respond 19 
positively only when critical technologies and market uncertainties are reduced by the 20 
government (38).  21 
However, in the field of the AD development, it is interesting that this may not be the 22 
case. The true story is that enterprises show a strong aspiration to support AD actively 23 
exploring the development boundary of it. Take Baidu as an example, for the information 24 
security of AD, it actively jointly established information security research laboratory with 25 
relevant enterprises, universities and research and development institutions; for the insurance 26 
of self-driving testing, it has signed cooperation agreements with many insurance companies 27 
to ensure the customer safety; for the judgment of accident liability, it has developed an Event 28 
Data Recorder (EDR) for AD system to provide reliable evidence for accident analysis, etc. 29 
This aspiration will be further confirmed in the next section, as it is of great significance for us 30 
to understand the unique efforts of the enterprises in the high-risk self-driving industry. 31 
 32 
Governance Entities for AD Development in China  33 
For the development of AD, the specific stakeholders and the current responsibility 34 
allocation of them are summarized as follows and are also shown in Figure 1 according to 35 
relevant policies, company websites and news reports. 36 
On the one hand, the main regulatory bodies on the side of the national government are 37 
the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), the Ministry of Public Security 38 
(MPS) and the Ministry of Transport (MOT). The MIIT plays a leading role in these aspects:  39 
(a) Formulation and implementation of the plans, industrial policies and standards 40 
relevant to the intelligent transport industry (which contains the concept of AD); 41 
(b) Management of industry daily operation; 42 
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(c) Promotion for the development and innovation of key technologies (e.g. intelligent 1 
chips, intelligent algorithms, etc.) and equipments (e.g. intelligent sensors, integrated circuits, 2 
operating systems, etc.) of AD; 3 
(d) Advancement of the research and development and standard-setting of information 4 
technology in the AD industry, and guaranteeing the national information security. 5 
The MPS and MOT are the main bodies of policy implementation. The former is 6 
responsible for allocating sufficient resources of the transport institutions in accordance with 7 
the development strategy of intelligent transport industry issued by MIIT, specific matters 8 
involve:  9 
(a) Managing the daily operation of AD (currently mainly refer to the road test 10 
management, safety assessment, investigation of safety accidents, judgement of the accident 11 
liability, etc.); 12 
(b) Security supervision of public information network; 13 
(c) Safety education of relevant enterprises and related personnel, etc.  14 
And the MOT is responsible for implementing relevant policies and regulations, 15 
focusing on managing the practical traffic organization behavior, its main tasks include: 16 
(a) Regulation of the AD market, involving the implementation and supervision of 17 
relevant policies, systems and technical standards;  18 
(b) Safety production of the industry (for example, understanding and promoting the 19 
research and development status of automation technology in major AD enterprises and 20 
scientific research institutions in China) and emergency management; 21 
(c) Transportation statistics for the self-driving industry, and guiding the industry to 22 
value the targets of environmental protection, energy conservation and emission reduction. 23 
On the other hand, the active organizations belonging to the social side are mainly private firms, 24 
including internet firms and vehicle manufacturing firms. Although vehicle manufacturing 25 
firms have major advantages, such as (a) systematic understanding of vehicle dynamics; (b) a 26 
large number of road test data; (c) decades of industry experience; (d) powerful strength in 27 
safety, reliability and manufacturing of automobile products, they lack of advanced core 28 
technology and team for promoting intelligent driving algorithm, and the strategic acuity to 29 
new technologies. These two flaws are exactly the unique advantages of the internet firms. For 30 
internet companies, they are very clear that the ultimate carrier of AD technology is the vehicle, 31 
so in order to make the driverless system closer to the actual product, actually, in the 32 
development of AVs, they adopt a cooperative relationship to solve the problems of research 33 
and development of AD technology as well as its commercial operation. 34 
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Ministry of Industry and Information Technology(MIIT)
 Policy  and standard formulation and implementation
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Ministry of Public Security (MPS) 
 Daily operation management 
 Security supervision of public information network
 Safety management education
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 Internet firms  
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 High sensitivity to new Technologies
Vehicle manufacturing firms
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 Road test data
 Automotive industry experience
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Figure 1 Functions of AD related entities and their mutual relationship  3 
Source: Authors’ summary and compilation based on related information from government websites of 4 
China. 5 
Note: The underlined part is the responsibility related to AD development that departments should be 6 
assigned according to the administrative system, but has not been paid attention to at present. 7 
 8 
A RESPONSE TO AD: INNOAVATIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 9 
GOVERNMENT AND FIRMS  10 
The regulatory relationship between the government and firms has always attracted 11 
social controversy (39-41).When it comes to the government-firm relationship in AD’s 12 
regulation, some academicians believe that the government should realize its own functions 13 
(for instance, safety, traffic congestion, social equity and civil well-being) in public affairs 14 
relevant with AD by regulating enterprises behavior (42). Others argue that AD, as a fusion of 15 
information technology (IT) and the automobile industry, has great potential in its development 16 
scenarios (43,44), and recommend less regulation to enable as many solutions as possible to 17 
emerge in various scenarios. Actually, it is necessary to create a balanced regulation 18 
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relationship between government and firms, because too much regulation may hinder the 1 
ability of the market sector to participate and innovate, while too little regulation may lead to 2 
results that are not in the public interests (45). 3 
As mentioned above, the government used to regard itself as the regulator of enterprises, 4 
but now has realized that it should change its previous management-oriented relationship with 5 
enterprises into a service-oriented relationship. In this context, the new governance relationship 6 
of government and enterprises for the promotion of AD should be paid attention to, which will 7 
determine the self-driving development process in China. And this issue will be illustrated 8 
based on the analysis of related policy documents, firm websites and media reports. 9 
 10 
The Lagging Policies and the Progressive Enterprises 11 
Interestingly, in the development of AD, there is an innovation compared with the 12 
traditional regulatory manner of government and firms. As explained in the previous section, 13 
our traditional perception is that firms only invest heavily in some high-risk industries after the 14 
government determines its position. However, the situation in China seems to be different in 15 
the AD’s rising stage. 16 
As seen in Figure 2, policies published by the government is mainly geared to low-17 
level intelligent networking vehicles. What’s more, the rank of the laws specialized for AVs is 18 
relatively limited and is mainly at the Ministries’ level, lack of amendment for superior law.  19 
2013 2015 2016 2018
 Get involved in AD 
industry
 Focus on  research and 
development of AD Technology
 Obtain California AV road 
test licenses and conduct tests
 Obtain domestic testing license and develop 
domestic closed environment testing
Actively try  to test on real road 
 First proposal for the AD 
strategic target (47)
2017
 Establish the national standard system 
for vehicle networking industry (48)
  Publish the first intelligent 
connected vehicle test standard (49)
 Publish the first  standard   of 
closed test facilities for AVs (50)
Normative documents 
at ministerial level
High-rank law 《Highway law of the PR of China》《 Road Traffic Safety Law of  
the PR of China》
Reach multi-party cooperation to 








Figure 2 Time series diagram of firms' efforts and government's policy decisions 22 
Source: compiled by the author from various policy documents and company reports. 23 
Note: With respect to the AD related enterprises, we investigate the self-driving development process of 24 
representative enterprises in China, including Baidu, Tencent, NIO, SAIC, Dongfeng, Geely, etc. In terms of 25 
the government side, it is worth noting that:(a) statistics is mainly concentrate on the publication of 26 
representative innovative policies at the national level (there is no list of local governments who actively 27 
develop AD, such as Beijing, Shanghai, etc.); (b) the national standard system of vehicle networking industry 28 
formulated in 2017 focuses on Advanced Driving Assistance System (ADAS), which not directly aim at 29 
promoting the field of AD; (c) The difference between intelligent connected vehicle and the AV is that the 30 
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former is the initial stage of intelligent vehicle technology, while AV is the highest stage of intelligent vehicle. 1 
Consequently, the legislative progress is lagging, which may lead to the contradiction between 2 
AD usage and the high rank law. For example, The Road Traffic Safety Law of the People's 3 
Republic of China claims that" the driver's license must be obtained in accordance with the law 4 
to be able to drive a motor vehicle (46)". This means that it is not clear whether the AD system 5 
can replace a human driver to control the vehicle on the road. Moreover, the law also stipulates 6 
that drivers should not have behavior such as answering phones and watching TV, which 7 
hinders safe driving (46). But this regulation contradicts the commercial purpose of providing 8 
leisure and entertainment for AD users to a certain extent. 9 
Despite the lagging effect of the policy-making, enterprises are still optimistic about 10 
AD’s prospects, as Baidu believe that the future of transportation should be composed of AD, 11 
and China's AD industry will have the ability and opportunity to stand at the forefront of the 12 
world in 3-5 years. Guided by this confidence, firms are leading the way of the research and 13 
development of AD, and they are actively conducting AV safety tests and promoting the 14 
commercial operation process of AVs. Figure 3 shows the changing trend of the investment 15 
amount as well as the investment number in AD industry from 2013 (the time that AD started 16 
to develop in China) to 2018 (the time that legal closed road test of AD has realized in China). 17 
We can learn from these data that in 2013-2015, when the government has not paid attention 18 
to the self-driving industry, the investment amount in it has displayed a slow growth trend; And 19 
in 2015-2018, it shows a sharp growth, thanks to the national strategic objectives issued for 20 
AD and the promulgation of relevant policies (see Figure 2). It is worth noting that under the 21 
condition that the number change of investment is flat (2016-2018), the amount of investment 22 
is increasing steeply, which suggests that the amount involved in each investment is increasing 23 
year by year. 24 
 25 























































Figure 3 The changing trend of the investment amount and the investment number in AD 27 
industry from 2013 to 2018 28 
Source: compiled by the author from various news resources. 29 
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Enterprise Alliances and Policy-making Progress 1 
Faced with the technical difficulties of AD and the lack of industry standards, firms are 2 
increasingly aware that individual efforts are weak to build an AV that is safe enough to make 3 
profits in the future. Based on this consideration, cooperation alliance has been regarded as a 4 
preferred pathway to defray costs, share risk and exchange resources and signals which convey 5 
industry recognition (51). Baidu is considered as a valuable partner relying on its cutting-edge 6 
technology resources. A major alliance of enterprises integrated by it is a representative case, 7 
which involves various types of AD-related firms including suppliers of components and 8 
solutions (e.g. sensors, high precision maps, V2X technology and AI algorithms), vehicle 9 
manufacturing enterprises, AD start-ups, mobility service companies, university institutes and 10 
government agencies. The 145 companies cooperated with Baidu Apollo (52) are categorized 11 
according to the above different compositions, as shown in Figure 4. We can know that the 12 
AD’s cooperative platform built by Baidu covers the main elements of AD, and specifically 13 
focuses on components and solution suppliers, and vehicle manufacturing enterprises. 14 
 Components & solution suppliers
 Vehicle manufacturing enterprises
 AD start-ups
 Mobility service companies




Figure 4 Enterprise alliance components of Baidu Apollo (2017-) 17 
Source: compiled by author from Baidu company website. 18 
 19 
Moreover, these alliances that established in recent years attempt to motivate the 20 
government to accelerate the policy-making process (53), which corresponds to the positive 21 
role orientation of the AD enterprises. For example, in 2017, driven by Baidu and its alliance 22 
partners, Beijing issued the first local government-level test management standard for AVs in 23 
China (54); In 2018, Alibaba Group, Highway Institute of MOT, FAW Group and other 24 
institutions jointly established a "2038 Premier League" to promote the development of 25 
technology and standards related to AD in V2X (Vehicle to Everything) technology, vehicle-26 
road coordination and other fields; In 2019, Baidu launched the White Paper "Safety First for 27 
Automated Driving" with 11 enterprises, such as APTV, BMW, Audi, etc. This document 28 
expounds the research and development, testing and verification framework for the safety of 29 
AVs and tend to prompt the government to set up a unified industry standard. 30 
 31 
Government New Roles: Participant and Service Provider 32 
These two types of innovative relationship between government and enterprises has 33 
developed uniquely but not surprisingly, because they seem to correspond to Chinese 34 
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administrative institution reform, descriptively, all respond to the requirements of industry and 1 
market self-regulation emphasized in the reform. Moreover, in terms of the government 2 
function changes in the reform, the fact is that since 2017, governments are not only involved 3 
in self-driving governance as a regulator but also have sought new roles (i.e. industry 4 
participants and service provider) to develop AD. In this way, the government is willing and 5 
able to negotiate and conclude cooperation relationship with potential service partners. The 6 
specific practice includes the following three aspects: 7 
 Since 2015, MIIT has taken the lead with some local governments in building AD test 8 
bases in several provinces and municipalities to serve the testing demands of local AD 9 
enterprises. At present, 14 cities in China have completed the test base construction of AVs, 10 
as shown in Figure 5. In addition, MOT, as the main body of daily operation supervision 11 
for AD, has certified three closed test bases, namely, Research Institute of Highway 12 
Ministry of Transport (a research institution directly under the state ministry), Chongqing 13 
Vehicle Test and Research Institute (a vehicle product quality inspection institution at the 14 
local government level), and Chang'an University (the only comprehensive automobiles 15 
performance test field among China’s universities), which are displayed in Figure 5. 16 
Relying on these three institutions, the official AD certification system can be constructed 17 
















Test & Research Institute
Research Institute of 
Highway Ministry of Transport
 19 
 20 
Figure 5 Geographical distribution of AD test bases in China 21 
Source: compiled by the author from news reports, government and university websites. 22 
 23 
 The government often participates in the AD industry by investing in AD companies 24 
through industrial funds led by government or state-owned enterprises. For example, 25 
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Shanghai International Automobile City Group (wholly state-owned group) launched "Star 1 
Program" in 2017, investing 200 million specialized funds to support 100 self-driving 2 
related venture projects; Chongqing industry-guiding fund owned by Chongqing 3 
government, also join with many private funds and set up a fund of 700 million yuan for 4 
the intelligent vehicle industry. 5 
 Furthermore, a public-private partnership was reached by the government and enterprises 6 
to build smart cities and relieve urban traffic pressure, at the same time, stimulate regional 7 
economy. The typical examples are that Xiongan New Area government signed a strategic 8 
cooperation agreement with Baidu Company in December 2017; Changsha Municipal 9 
People's Government, Hunan Xiangjiang New Area Management Committee and Baidu 10 
Company also jointly signed a strategic cooperation agreement in October, 2018. And this 11 
trend seems to grow due to the change of government's role orientation from omnipotent 12 
government to limited government resulting from the deepening institutional reform.  13 
 14 
CONCLUSIONS  15 
Despite the rise of AD in recent years, there is a comparison between the rapid 16 
advancement of the industry by the self-driving enterprises and the backward process of the 17 
government's policy-making. Therefore, the urgent issue is the AD’s regulation problem. 18 
Aiming at responding to this problem, we attempt to clarify the regulatory status of AD’s 19 
development, considering the specific development pattern of the government and enterprises. 20 
Through the investigation of relevant policy documents, firm websites and media reports, the 21 
following results are obtained in this paper. 22 
First, in developing AD, it seems that it is problematic for government’s interventions 23 
or non-interventions, while for enterprises, they have strong aspiration in supporting AD. 24 
Second, in terms of the governance entities involved in AD’s development, it is 25 
summarized that the main regulatory bodies of the national government are the MIIT, the MPS 26 
and the MOT, among them, the MIIT play a leading role. And they regulate the AD 27 
development mainly by issuing normative documents currently. At the same time, internet 28 
firms and vehicle manufacturing firms also have a contribution for promoting AD, who have 29 
their own unique advantages. 30 
Third, there is an innovative development pattern between government and enterprises 31 
for improving the progress of AD. Three representative trends are: 32 
 Enterprises, who have great ambitions for developing AD, actively implement 33 
investment and research and development in a lagging legislation environment; 34 
 Whilst the government takes a relatively conservative attitude in the legislation and 35 
regulation of AD, enterprises actively promote the formulation process of relevant 36 
policies through establishing a large alliance of enterprises; 37 
 Adapting to the administrative system reform, government shifts its role of a 38 
regulator to a participant and service provider, by the way of building AD test bases 39 
for AD firms, investing in the firms through industrial funds led by government or 40 
state-owned enterprises and establishing public-private partnership. 41 
This status quo of the role relationship between the government and enterprises implies 42 
Xue, Xu, and Mullen 
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the government’s rulemaking reticence and enterprises' proactive advancement in AD industry. 1 
And the situation may lead to an emerging risk that the government can be induced by 2 
enterprises to formulate policies beneficial to the interests of enterprises, and the results may 3 
be inconsistent with the government’s political targets (45). With the closing commercialization 4 
of AVs, we should aware that it would be an urgent problem than ever about how to create a 5 
balanced regulation relationship between government and firms so as to guarantee the social 6 
welfare and the bright future of AD.  7 
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